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LEAVING WELL ENOUGH ALONE:
REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF
ERISA REMEDIAL LAW
Thomas P. Gies* & Jane R. Foster*

I. INTRODUCTION

As lawyers who represent employers and health plans in Employee
Retirement Income Security Act' ("ERISA") litigation, we have some
strongly held views on the topic of this Symposium. The Symposium
title implies that ERISA's remedial scheme does not serve the interests
of plan participants. Although the current state of the law (at least with
respect to certain remedial issues) is undeniably complex, we believe the
Symposium title incorrectly suggests that there is something ironic about
this comer of the law. We also believe it would be unwise to alter the
balance articulated by Congress in the statute and applied (more or less)
consistently by the Supreme Court. And we believe that any attempts to
make incremental changes in the scope of ERISA remedies would be
counter-productive and thus, unwise as a matter of policy. From this
perspective, we offer some thoughts on the current understanding of
ERISA's two "preemption" provisions 2 and the courts' interpretation of

* Mr. Gies is a Partner with Crowell & Moring, LLP in its Washington, D.C. office and specializes
in labor and employment matters, including ERISA litigation. He represented the employer and
plan sponsor in LaRue v. DeWolffBoberg & Associates, 128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008). Mr. Gies received
his B.A. in 1972 from the University of Notre Dame and his J.D. in 1976 from the George
Washington University Law School.
** Ms. Foster is an associate with Crowell & Moring, LLP and works in the Labor and Employment
group in Washington, D.C. Ms. Foster received her B.A. in 2003 from Brandeis University and her
J.D. in 2006 from Harvard Law School.
1. 29U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
2. Section 514(a) of ERISA states in part that the statute "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" that is covered by
ERISA. Section 502(a) of ERISA sets forth the statute's civil enforcement scheme, listing the
remedies available under ERISA. As discussed infra Part V, preemption issues are often presented
in cases implicating section 502.
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ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in cases brought by plan
participants and beneficiaries. Because of time and space constraints,
this Article will not address several other important issues involving the
scope of ERISA's remedial provisions.
II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Much of the leading academic writing argues that ERISA provides
inadequate remedies to plan participants. 4 Because we assume other
Symposium participants are familiar with these arguments, they are not
repeated here. Our experience leads us to take issue with the
assumptions underlying some of the conclusions reached by scholars in
this area.
For example, we think it is not particularly useful to think of
ERISA in terms of primary versus secondary purposes.5
Such
formulations look a lot like revisionist history. Recent scholarship
reminds us that, in enacting ERISA, Congress was almost exclusively
concerned about protecting defined benefit pension plan benefits,

3. For example, the enforceability of subrogation provisions in plan documents remains an
actively litigated subject notwithstanding (or perhaps because of, depending on one's point of view)
the Court's decision in Sereboffv. Mid Atd. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006). A second
example involves the proper reading of section 502(a)(2) as to whether employer plan sponsors
have standing to bring actions seeking to clarify rights and obligations under ERISA plans. ERISA
§ 502 (a); e.g., Carl Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. W. Teamsters & Emp. Pension Fund, 847 F.2d 113,
124 (3d Cir. 1988). Third, the Article will not address preemption of specific state laws involving
mandated benefits, such as the New Jersey Mental Health Parity Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.20
(West 2009), that have considerable importance to the managed care community. E.g., Devito v.
Aetna, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 523, 531 (D.N.J. 2008). Finally, this Article does not address
enforceability of defined benefit plans or the scope of remedies in claims brought under the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By "'Equitable" The Supreme Court's
Trail Of Error In Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2003);
Colleen E. Medill, Resolving the Judicial Paradox of "Equitable" Relief Under ERISA Section
502(a)(3), 39 J.MARSHALL L. REV. 827, 829-30 (2006).

5. This is a view subscribed to, among others, by Professor Paul Secunda, Associate
Professor of Law at Marquette Law School and one of the organizers of this Symposium. An
abstract of the paper Professor Secunda presented at this Symposium argues that employees must
"depend on an inadequate 'comprehensive and reticulated' remedial scheme" under ERISA. Paul
M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionalityand the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
(forthcoming
2009),
abstract
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1273840. Professor Secunda alleges the Court
"accomplished this feat by elevating a secondary purpose of ERISA, to make sure employers
voluntarily adopt employee benefit plans over the primary purpose of ERISA, to ensure employees
and their beneficiaries are protected in their pension and welfare benefits." Id.
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primarily in the unionized segment of the manufacturing industry.6
Indeed, the case has been made that the Studebaker bankruptcy was the
principal impetus for ERISA. 7 Whatever one might think of the role of
organized labor in the passage of ERISA, we are reasonably certain that
Congress did not enact ERISA out of concern for the remedies available
to participants in health plans. After all, managed care was not common
in 1974, and there is nothing in the legislative history of ERISA to
suggest that Congress enacted section 502(a)(3) to provide
compensatory damage remedies in welfare plan claims disputes. As
Justice Marshall observed in Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 8 the discussion of
welfare plans in the ERISA legislative history was largely limited to the
statute's reporting and disclosure requirements. 9 Our review of the
legislative history leads us to conclude that it is more accurate to
acknowledge that the statute sets forth a series of "principal" objectives,
one of which is the promotion of private sector employer-sponsored
retirement plans. 10 As the Supreme Court famously observed in Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,11 ERISA "represents a careful balancing
of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the
public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit
plans. 12
We think it is a mistake to minimize the importance of the
voluntary formation principle in thinking about where to strike the
balance as to the scope of ERISA's remedial provisions under any
particular set of facts. For better or worse, employer-provided benefits
remain the cornerstone of the system. Medical benefits for private sector
employees are still primarily delivered through plans, policies, and
practices largely funded by employers. 13 Pension plans established by
6. See James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 1,
14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31, 32 (2006).
7. See James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business": The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683-84 (2001).
8. 472 U.S. 559 (1985).
9. Id. at 569 n.9.
10. See Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA 's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L.
REV. 201, 204 n.22 (1995) (listing ERISA's five purposes, quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1-2
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640). One of Congress's goals was the promotion
of"a renewed expansion of private retirement plans." H.R. REP. NO. 93-533.
11. 481 U.S. 41 (1987), overruled in part by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538
U.S. 329 (2003), and Selmon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 196 (Ark. 2008).
12. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
13. A study published by the Employee Benefit Research Institute ("EBRI") estimated that
161.7 million individuals were covered by employment-based health insurance in 2006, or roughly
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private sector employers, including 401(k) plans, remain the primary
means by which employees covered by such plans save for retirement.
Absent a massive overhaul of the U.S. health care system, there is no
reasonable alternative to the existing arrangements for both pension and
welfare benefits that have evolved over the last twenty-five years. 14
We believe the Supreme Court's decisions on ERISA remedies
have generally reflected an appropriate understanding of the importance
of avoiding outcomes that would put additional pressure on the current
system. Thus, in a variety of situations, the Court has recognized,
sensibly in our view, that it is not a good idea to impose additional costs
on employers and other plan sponsors.' 5 The Court has likewise
concluded that it is unwise to make it more difficult for large employers
to administer plans in a consistent way across the country. 16 Most
recently, in Kennedy v. DuPont Savings & Investment Plan,'7 the Court
unanimously reaffirmed the "plan documents" rule set forth in section
404(a)(1) of ERISA. 18 We think it is significant that Justice Souter's
opinion in Kennedy took as a given that it would be unwise to subject
plan administrators to the additional cost of sorting out, through various
types of collateral litigation, the question of whether plan beneficiaries
had reflected an intent to change their retirement plan beneficiary
designations in ways other than those expressly provided for in the plan
documents.' 9
two-thirds of the non-elderly population. William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption:
Implicationsfor Health Reform and Coverage, 314 EBRI IssuE BRIEF 1, 9-10 (2008).
14. Notwithstanding President Obama's ambitious plans to enact systemic reform of the
nation's health care system, it is unlikely that such overhaul will be enacted before the date of this
Symposium. We will leave for others the question of whether a systematic overhaul of the
country's health care delivery system can be achieved in the current political environment in a way
that meets the needs and expectations of all stakeholders in the system.
15. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148-50 (2001). In Egelhoff, the Court recognized
the "congressional goal of 'minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]' on plan
administrators." Id. at 149-50 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990)); see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 367-70 (2002) (discussing
this conception in the context of HMOs); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997) (discussing this
notion in the context of community property interests).
16. See Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 142 ("Allowing state based actions like the one at
issue here would subject plans and plan sponsors to burdens not unlike those that Congress sought
to foreclose through [section] 514(a)."); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 105 (1983)
("Congress minimized the need for interstate employers to administer their plans differently in each
State in which they have employees.") (footnote omitted).
17. 129 S. Ct. 865 (2009).
18. Id. at 875 (holding that the plan documents control as required by the statute).
19. Id. at 876 ("Plan administrators would be forced 'to examine a multitude of external
documents that might purport to affect the dispensation of benefits,' and be drawn in to litigation
like this over the meaning and enforceability of purported waivers.") (internal citations omitted).
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Particularly in the current economic conditions, the imposition of
substantial additional costs on the administration of employee benefit
plans, including increased litigation costs, would have predictably
perverse consequences. Outcomes that further compromise the ability of
private sector employers to shoulder the financial burden of maintaining
employee benefit plans will only increase the chances that fewer
employees and retirees (and their dependants) will be covered by such
plans.
For many of the same reasons, we believe it would be a mistake for
courts to start treating ERISA as a traditional make-whole statute.
Justice Scalia was surely correct in his observation in Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates20 that ERISA is a "complex and detailed statute that resolved
innumerable disputes between powerful competing interests-not all in
favor of potential plaintiffs.'
It is clear enough from the text of the
statute that Congress did not intend ERISA to provide make-whole relief
in the same sense as that term is used in employee rights statutes, such as
the National Labor Relations Act 22 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.23 The courts, in our view, have properly rejected contrary
arguments made by interest groups in a variety of situations. 24
Finally, we take issue with the notion that employers are blackhearted villains eager to find ways to keep their employees from getting
the benefits they deserve. We believe that Justice Scalia was also
correct, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,2 5 when he rejected
the respondent's request "to presume that all fiduciaries with a conflict
act in their selfish interest, so that their decisions are automatically
reviewed with less than total deference. 2 6 Instead, Justice Scalia
concluded, one should infer that a fiduciary "suppressed his selfish
interest ...

in compliance with his duties of good faith and loyalty. 2 7

Our practice involves helping sophisticated and well-meaning employers
comply with both the letter and spirit of an extremely complex statute.
In our experience, employers are not involved in a game of "gotcha"
20. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
21. Id. at 262 (citation omitted).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69(2006).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
24. Insurance companies and others seeking to enforce subrogation provisions in ERISA
plans are included in our definition of interest groups. We believe the views of the would-be
enforcers of subrogation agreements are no more or less worthy than those expressed by participants
and beneficiaries.
25. 128 S.Ct. 2343 (2008).
26. Id. at 2360 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (citations omitted).
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where they look for ways to keep their employees from receiving
promised benefits.
Sophisticated employers take their fiduciary
responsibilities seriously, as well as the obligation to act in accordance
with the terms of the plan. In some cases, that means giving people
accurate, but admittedly unhappy news about their entitlement to
claimed benefits under a particular plan. Enforcing the rules does not
make employers chintzy, let alone evil. Most U.S. employers are simply
trying to do what it takes to maintain competitive employee benefit plans
for their employees in the face of increasingly difficult economic
conditions.
III. PREEMPTION OF STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS

The watershed Supreme Court decision regarding the preemption of
state common law claims is Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila.2 8 The Supreme
Court ruled unanimously that the state law claim asserted there, based on
the Texas Health Care Liability Act 29 ("THCLA"), was preempted by
ERISA. 30 The Texas statute imposed duties on managed health care
entities to "exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions," and made HMOs liable for damages "proximately caused"
by failure to exercise that ordinary care in the provision of services.3 '
The plaintiffs in Davila alleged that their HMOs' refusal to cover certain
medications and hospital stays proximately caused them additional
injury and therefore violated Texas law.32
The Supreme Court found that the state law causes of action were
preempted by section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, even though the state law
28. 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004). Davila was the culmination of a series of Supreme Court cases
striking down various state laws providing a damages remedy outside of the scope of ERISA's civil
enforcement mechanism. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 378 (2002)
("Congress had not intended causes of action under ERISA itself beyond those specified in [section
502](a)."); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) ("[T]he requirements of
conflict pre-emption [were] satisfied in this case . . . the Texas cause of action purport[ed] to
provide a remedy for the violation of a right expressly guaranteed by [section] 510 and exclusively
enforced by [section] 502(a)."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (striking
down state law providing remedies for consumers who had been subject to unfair claims practices
by insurers), overruled in part by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2002),
and Selmon v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 196 (Ark. 2008).
29. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.001-.003 (West 2007), invalidated by Davila,
542 U.S. 200 (2004), and Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D.
Tex. 1998), rev'd in part 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000), and overruled in part by Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
30. Davila, 542 U.S. at 204.
31. Id. at 205 (quoting THCLA § 88.002(a)).
32. Id. at 204-05.
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causes of action were not identical to a claim for benefits under
ERISA
The Court explained that the state law claims existed only
because-the HMOs administered ERISA-regulated benefit plans. 34 Thus,
the Court concluded, the claims did not "attempt to remedy any violation
of a legal duty independent of ERISA. ' 3 5 Though the Texas statute
authorized remedies unavailable in ERISA, this attempt to supplement
ERISA remedies did not place the state statute "outside of the scope of
ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism., 36
As Justice Thomas
explained, "Congress' intent to make the ERISA civil enforcement
mechanism exclusive would be undermined if state causes of action that
supplement the ERISA section 502(a) remedies were permitted, even if
the elements of the state cause3 7 of action did not precisely duplicate the
elements of an ERISA claim.
In reaching this result, the Court announced a clear rule in favor of
preemption of state-law causes of action that attempted to supplement
the remedies available under section 502 of ERISA.38 As Justice
Thomas put it, "any state-law cause of action that duplicates,
supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts
with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive
and is therefore pre-empted . 39. . . The preemptive force of ERISA
section 502(a) is still stronger.,
All nine Supreme Court justices agreed that the Texas statute was
preempted by ERISA.4 °
In what has since become a famous
concurrence (at least in the world of ERISA litigation), Justice Ginsburg
wrote that the Court's conclusion was consistent with the Court's
"governing case law. 4 1 She lamented the fact section 502 did not
always provide the full range of remedies often sought by plaintiffs and
urged Congress (or the Court) to "revisit" the ERISA regime to remedy
the holes left by its remedial scheme.4 2
Davila has largely resolved the question of ERISA preemption of
state law claims. Lower courts have struck down as preempted various

33. Id. at 216,221.
34. Id. at 213.
35. Id. at 214.
36. Id. at 214-15.
37. Id. at 216.
38. Id. at 209.
39. Id. (internal citations omitted).
40. Id. at 202.
41. Id. at 222 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,
453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)).
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types of state law claims raised by plan participants and beneficiaries,
even if the claim is not completely duplicative of an ERISA cause of
action.4 3 The law is less settled with respect to whether an action
brought by other entities involved in plan administration should be seen
as an assignment of a participant's claim for benefits under section
502(a)(1)(B) or a claim based on an independent legal claim of right.44
In addition to correctly interpreting ERISA, the Court in Davila
also struck the proper balance regarding ERISA's remedial scope. Since
Pilot Life Insurance Co., the Court has repeatedly acknowledged the
importance of encouraging the formation of employer-sponsored plans.45
As noted above, the legislative history demonstrates Congress' concern
about imposing excessive costs on employer plan sponsors.4 6 It would
be a profoundly bad idea to make the employee benefits world the
plaintiffs' bar's next dream come true by consigning every alleged error
in benefit plan administration to the tender mercies of state tort law. 47 It
43. See Kilar v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 195 Fed. App'x 547, 549 (9th Cir. 2006);
Hutchison v. Fifth Third Bancorp., 469 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2006); Barber v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
ofAm., 383 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2004).
44. Such cases often arise in disputes between health care providers and plans over payment
of medical services. Courts have attempted to differentiate between "assigned" and "third party"
claims, the latter of which are often not found preempted. See Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook
Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1990) (ERISA does not preempt claim of health care
provider alleging misrepresentation as to coverage of medical treatment). The distinction can be
difficult to recognize in particular cases. Compare Doctors Med. Ctr. of Modesto, Inc. v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:08-CV-00903, 2009 WL 179681, at *2-4,*6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009)
(no preemption of a medical provider's claim of tortious interference with contract against a claims
processing company in connection with a dispute over non-payment of the provider's medical
expenses; plaintiff claimed that the insurance company had an independent legal obligation to
reimburse the provider), with In re Managed Care Litigation, No. 00-1334-MD, 2009 WL 210689,
at *2, *10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2009) (complete preemption applies to claims brought by Missouri
out-of-network physicians against health insurers that allegedly denied and delayed payment of
claims on improper grounds).
45. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376 (2002) (recognizing the
"public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987))); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 524 U.S. 200, 208 (2004)
(quoting the same passage from Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54). Congress recognized that high costs of
maintaining voluntary employee benefit plans could deter employers from offering them,
acknowledging the need to "strike a balance between providing meaningful reform and keeping
costs within reasonable limits." H.R. REP. No. 93-779, at 14-15 (1974).
46. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 2 (1974) ("[Congress] ... weighed carefully the additional costs
to the employers and minimized these costs to the extent consistent with minimum standards for
retirement benefits."); 123 CoNG. REc. 120, at 29198 (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 4673 (1976) (remarks

of Senator Ullman) ("[P]ension plans cannot be expected to develop if costs are made overly
burdensome, particularly for employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be selfdefeating and would be unfavorable .... ").
47. As Davila percolated through the lower courts, representatives of the plaintiffs' bar
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is by now well understood that litigation imposes increased costs across
society, retarding job creation and ultimately harming consumers.4a One
does not have to think too hard before concluding that it would be
ruinous to the employer-based health care delivery system if health care
goes the way of tobacco, asbestos, and other species of repetitive tort
litigation. After all, as the Court observed in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff,49
additional administrative burdens and costs will "ultimately [be] borne
by the beneficiaries" of the plan.5 °
After more than twenty-five years of this aspect of ERISA
preemption jurisprudence, we think the Court has gotten it about right.
Read together, the Court's decisions, culminating in Davila, have
achieved what must be seen as an appropriate balance of the rights and
obligations of all stakeholders involved in ERISA plan administration.
Perhaps the best evidence that the current state of the law regarding the
appropriate scope of section 502 is not such a bad thing is the fact that
Congress has found it unnecessary to make any changes to this part of
the statute, including, most recently, in the Pension Plan Protection Act
of 2006.51
Yet the current balance is tenuous. Developments in other areas of
the law may signal a change in the Court's view of preemption. Recent
decisions suggest a greater sympathy for a more aggressive
interpretation of the presumption against preemption that applies in
some areas of the law. The Court's recent decision in Altria Group, Inc.
v. Good52 is illustrative. There, a group of cigarette smokers brought a

argued that tort claims brought under a variety of state law "bad faith" statutes should be immune
from preemption. See Donald T. Bogan, Saving State Law Bad-Faith Claims From Preemption,
TRIAL (2003), available at http://www.harp.orgbogan. The Court wisely rejected that argument,
obviously recognizing this as the exception that would swallow the preemption rule. Davila, 542
U.S. at 221. There is no reason to believe that the plaintiffs' bar has lost interest in the issue.
Indeed, as described below, the rise in creative uses of section 502(a)(3) can be traced to a
recognition among plaintiffs lawyers that Davila was the end of the line as far as state law tort
claims were concerned, and that they were more likely to be successful in getting big judgments and
settlements by proceeding under a newly-minted interpretation of section 502(a)(3) itself, arguing
for an expansive interpretation of the term "equitable relief." See infra Part V.
48. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 4-5 (Harvard University
Press 198 1) (addressing the "implicit economic structure of the common law").
49. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
50. Id. at 151 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)); see also
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (rejecting the notion that state malpractice law
should cover HMO decision-making, asking, "what would be gained by opening the federal
courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice claim," and concluding that there would be no benefit

to the plan participant in "welcoming such unheard-of' litigation).
51.

Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).

52.

129 S.Ct. 538 (2008).
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civil action against a cigarette manufacturer alleging that the
manufacturer's advertisements were misrepresentations that violated
Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act ("MUTPA").53 The cigarette
manufacturer argued that the state law claim was preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Act, 54 which requires all
cigarette packaging to contain the Surgeon General's warning and
preempts state laws adding to the federally prescribed warning.5 5 The
Court concluded that the federal law did not encompass a general duty
not to make fraudulent statements and thus did not preempt claims
brought under state law.56 Other cases working their way through the
courts may cause a broader reassessment of the reach of federal law
preemption. Because the tobacco wars are sui generis, the Levine v.
Wyeth 57 case is most likely the next candidate.58 However one might
feel about preemption generally, a subsequent decision that reverses
field in this area of ERISA preemption would be most unfortunate for
the current private sector benefits delivery system.
IV. PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVES

Section 514 of ERISA is widely understood as one of the most
expansive preemption provisions in federal statutory law. Specifically,
section 514(a) expressly preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 59 In Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,60 the Supreme Court explained in broad terms that
this language applies to any state mandate that "has a connection with or
reference to such a plan., 61 In Shaw, the Supreme Court ruled that a
New York state law was preempted to the extent it required employers to
provide pregnancy disability benefits in excess of what was then
62
required by Title VII.

53. Id. at 541; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207 (2009).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (2006)
55. Id. at §§ 1333, 1334(b).
56. Altria, 128 S. Ct. at 549 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 529
(1992)).
57. 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. grantedsub nom. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 337 (2008).
58. Id. at 184 (raising the question of whether FDA-approved warnings on prescription
medications preempt various state failure-to-warn claims).
59. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (2006).
60. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
61. Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
62. Id.
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In the years following Shaw, the Court struck down, as preempted
under section 514, a variety of state law initiatives that were held to
"relate to" ERISA benefit plan administration. For example, in Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,63 the Court held that a New Jersey statute
that prohibited pension plans from offsetting benefits to plan participants
who received workers compensation benefits under state law was
preempted. 64 In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,65
the Court held that a provision of a Georgia garnishment statute that
exempted ERISA plans from its coverage was preempted, irrespective of
the fact that the intent of that statute was consistent with the purposes of
ERISA.66 And in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,67 the Court held preempted a
Pennsylvania law prohibiting an ERISA plan to pursue a subrogation
68
claim.
After Shaw, the Court also struck down state and local government
legislation mandating employers to provide certain types of employee
benefits. For example, in District of Columbia v. Greater Washington
Board of Trade,69 the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted a
District of Columbia law that required employers who provided health
insurance benefits to their employees to continue "equivalent" coverage
to employees who become "eligible for workers compensation
benefits. 7 ° In Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts,7 1 the
Supreme Court concluded that state mandated benefits statutes "relate
to" ERISA plans and are thus preempted unless within the scope of
section 514's "savings clause. 7 2
Lower courts reached similar
73
outcomes.
In 1995, this feature of the preemption landscape began to change.

63. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
64. Id. at 508, 526 (citations omitted).
65. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
66. Id. at 830.
67. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
68. Id. at 54, 65.
69. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
70. Id. at 126-27.
71. 471 U.S. 724 (1985), overruled in part by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 528
U.S. 329 (2003), and Quality Infusion Care Inc. v. Aetna Health Inc., 39 Empl. Benefits Cas.
(BNA) 2661 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2006).
72. Id. at 733.
73. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1989)
(New York prevailing wage statute preempted by obligating employers to provide certain level and
type of fringe benefits), rev'd in part, 936 F.2d 1448 (2d Cir. 1991); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760, 766 (9th Cir. 1980) (Hawaii law mandating employee health coverage held
preempted), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
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In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,74 the Supreme Court upheld a New York state
law that required patients of commercial insurers to pay a surcharge on
hospital services not applicable to patients of other insurance
providers.75 In determining whether the state statute was preempted, the
Supreme Court explained it would look, first to the text of section 514(a)
and then if necessary, to the "structure and purpose" of ERISA.7 6 The
Court found that "nothing in the language of the Act or the context of its
passage indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care
regulation."" Thus, in Travelers Insurance Co., and two years later in
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, N. A., Inc.,7 8 the Court seemed to limit its decisions in
earlier cases, at least with respect to
the relationship between ERISA and
79
state laws of general applicability.
Justice Scalia acknowledged the Court's inconsistencies in
approaches to interpreting section 514 in his concurrence in Dillingham:
Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has accepted certiorari
in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts in the Courts
of Appeals regarding ERISA pre-emption of various sorts of state law.
The rate of acceptance, moreover, has not diminished (we have taken
two more ERISA pre-emption cases so far this Term), suggesting that
80
our prior decisions have not succeeded in bringing clarity to the law.
Justice Scalia went on to suggest that the Court should acknowledge
that
8
its earlier broad interpretation of the text "relates to" was "wrong.", 1
Decisions since Dillingham have largely failed to reconcile the
competing interpretations of section 514(a).82 While more recent

74. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
75. Id. at 649.
76. Id.
at 655.
77. Id. at 661.
78. 519 U.S,316 (1997).
79. Id.
at 334.
80. Id. at 334-35.
81. Id. at 336. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia recommended abandoning the "relates to"
test in favor of conflict and field preemption principles used in other areas of the law. Id. Those
areas of preemption analysis often involve complex questions of both express and implied
preemption that are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S.Ct.
999 (2008) (express preemption in federal statute precluded lawsuits against medical device
manufacturers); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (implied preemption in
federal statute precluded common law tort claim).
82. See generally Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997) (Court did not interpret ERISA's
preemption clause, section 514(a), but instead framed issue as whether "state law conflicts with the
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decisions demonstrate that the Court has retreated from the purely
textualist approach articulated in Shaw, the narrower interpretation of
section 514 suggested in Travelers has not taken hold (at least not
completely).83 Indeed, in some cases the Court has explicitly adopted
the broad reading of section 514 articulated in Shaw in finding state
initiatives preempted by section 514(a).84
The uncertainty in the scope of section 514 preemption is
problematic for employers as more and more states and localities attempt
to enact various types of health care coverage mandates. Mandates
increase the cost of coverage, decrease flexibility, and defeat one of
ERISA's primary objectives-maintaining uniformity in plan
administration.
The lack of clarity regarding section 514 surely contributed to the
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Golden Gate RestaurantAssociation v.
San Francisco,85 upholding the San Francisco Health Care Security
Ordinance.86 An association of restaurant operators challenged the
ordinance, arguing that ERISA preempted the mandate. The Ninth
Circuit panel rejected this argument, concluding that the San Francisco
ordinance does not regulate the terms of any employers' ERISA plans.87
This conclusion was based primarily on a feature of the ordinance giving
employers the option of making a contribution to the city that would be

provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objectives"); De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. &
Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997) (noting that the language of section 514(a) is
"opaque").
83. See e.g., Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2000).
84. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 844-45. The Boggs Court split 5-4 as to whether a provision of
Louisiana's community property statute was subject to ERISA preemption. Id. at 841. Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion found the state law preempted on the basis of what he perceived as a
direct conflict between the state law scheme and ERISA's rules governing joint and survivor
annuities in ERISA retirement plans. Id. at 844. The majority was explicit in stating that it need not
address the question of the literal meaning of the "relate to" clause in section 514. Id. at 841.
Although Boggs plainly represents a different approach to the issue that seems closer to conflict
preemption analysis, the outcome hardly suggests a more restrictive view of ERISA preemption in
future cases. The four dissenting Justices in Boggs lamented the majority's failure to acknowledge
that state laws concerning family, property and probate issues are "all areas of traditional, and
important, state concern." Id. at 861. The dissenters concluded that the state law at issue did not
concern a subject Congress intended to "place outside a State's legal reach." Id.; see also Egelhoff,
532 U.S. at 147-48 (finding that a state statute providing for automatic revocation of a spouse's
rights upon divorce under certain ERISA benefit plans was preempted because of its "impermissible
connection" to ERISA and its interference with the goal of "nationally uniform plan
administration").
85. 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008).
86. Id. at 642.
87. Id. at 647.
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88
used to fund health care benefits through a city-sponsored program.
The court decided that this option did not constitute an "ERISA plan"
and, accordingly, that the ordinance was not preempted under section
514.89 The court also concluded that the San Francisco ordinance was
materially different from a Maryland statute that was held preempted by
the Fourth Circuit.90
We share the view of others who have found this conclusion
unpersuasive. Professor Edward Zelinsky seems correct in concluding
that the employers' ongoing payment for their employees' health care at
least arguably constitutes an employee health benefit plan, irrespective
of whether the program is sponsored by the city or the employers. 9' As
he explains, courts have been reasonably consistent in interpreting the
statutory text and implementing regulations to conclude that "employers'
ongoing outlays for their employees' medical coverage constitute 'plans'
for ERISA purposes." 92 Under the ordinance, employers are required to
make continuing payments that are analytically "indistinguishable" from
employers' payments to93traditional insurers which automatically give
rise to ERISA treatment.
However well-intentioned, benefit mandate requirements such as
the San Francisco ordinance are contrary to fundamental objectives of
ERISA. First, such requirements obviously disrupt ERISA's goal of
encouraging uniform administration of benefit plans nationwide. As the
Court noted in Egelhoff:

One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers "to
establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of
standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits." Uniformity is impossible, however,
if plans are subject to
94
different legal obligations in different States.
Similarly, local mandates increase costs for employers. According
to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, "mandated benefits cause

88. Id. at 645.
89. Id. at 649, 661.
90. Id. at 659-60; see also Retail Indus. Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007)
(striking down as preempted the Maryland "Fair Share Health Care Fund Act").
91. Edward A. Zelinksy, Employer Mandates and ERISA Preemption: A Critique of Golden
Gate Restaurant Association v. San Francisco, 50 ST. TAX NOTES 503 (2008).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 148 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9
(1987)).
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reductions in coverage owing to small firms' greater sensitivity to
price. 9 5 For some, particularly smaller, employers, mandates provide
96
the tipping point on whether to provide benefits in the first instance."
At an intellectual level, settled principles of federalism surely
justify many of these efforts.97 There is often much to be said for having
state governments act as laboratories for experiments on new solutions
to economic and social issues. In the world of health care, experiments98
like that underway in Massachusetts may yield promising solutions.
Yet it seems that the health care delivery system may be too complex to
hope that meaningful reform can percolate up from the statehouses.
Scholars, including Andrew Fichter, have questioned whether the
various state healthcare coverage laws passed to date have, in fact,
shown much innovation. 99 There are surely many reasons for this,
including the fact that, as written, ERISA broadly limits the ability of
states and local governments to tinker with the health care delivery
system. From where we sit, the problem is far too complex to be solved
in any manner short of Congressional action.100 Any legislative change
that would include an amendment to section 514 of ERISA should be
part of a comprehensive approach to the benefit delivery system that
would not frustrate the important goals of encouraging plan formation
and the promotion of uniformity in plan administration.

95. Perrion & Fronstein, supra note 13, at 11.
96. Id. at 12 (finding that "roughly 18 percent of businesses that are currently without
coverage would likely sponsor coverage but for mandates").
97. Yet other initiatives cannot be justified on federalism grounds. The motive behind a
particular initiative is often properly considered in determining the scope of section 514 preemption.
For example, the Maryland statute overturned in Fielder was an unsubtle attempt by supporters of
organized labor to strike a blow against Wal-Mart. See Thomas P. Gies, The Maryland 'Wal-Mart
Bill '-IsIt Preempted By ERISA?, EMP. REL. L.J., Sept. 22, 2006.
98. In 2006, Massachusetts enacted comprehensive health care reform legislation. See 2006
Mass. Acts ch. 58. Among other things, the statute provides subsidized health care to lower-income
employees through a device called the Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118H (2006). Through a variety of means, the statute requires all citizens to
obtain health insurance coverage. Id. at ch. I 11M § 2. The law imposes a variety of taxes on
employers doing business in Massachusetts to help fund the increased coverage. Id. at ch. I 11M §
18(b). The law has not yet faced a legal challenge based on ERISA preemption.
99. See Andrew J. Fichter, State Healthcare Coverage Reform: Where is Federalism Leading
Us?, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 629 (2008).
100. Professor Fichter seems to agree with this view. He observes that health care reform
should be done at the federal level in part because ERISA serves a valid interstate purpose in
encouraging multi-state employers to offer benefits. Fichter, supra note 99, at 639.
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V. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 502

A. Section 502 (a)(3) and Welfare Plan Claims

1. Introduction
The Court's decision in Davila has led to a flood of litigation in
which plaintiffs have sought an expansive reading of section 502(a)(3).
This development is not surprising in light of Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion.' 0 ' Yet, in our view, if there is any irony in ERISA
Notwithstanding their unending
remedial jurisdiction, it is here.
creativity, plaintiffs' lawyers appear not to have understood that section
502(a)(3) could be interpreted to support a claim for damages until the
doors to the courthouse began to close. It was only then that advocates
realized they might be able to open a door to the federal courthouse (and
stay there) if they could conjure up a way to characterize various legal
theories in terms cognizable under section 502(a)(3).10 2 Of course the
Court's decision in Mertens,'0 3 with its observation that 502(a)(3) must
be limited to equitable claims "typically available" in equity, stood in the
way.104 Few areas of ERISA remedial litigation have been more hotly
contested in the last ten years than the meaning of the term "appropriate
equitable relief."' 0 5 In our judgment, this is one of the most important
issues on which the courts have generally reached the right result.
2. Claims for Compensatory Damages
The Supreme Court decided, first in Mertens and then in GreatWest Insurance v. Knudson,'0 6 that a claim for money damages is not
available under section 502(a)(3).10 7 The majority opinion in GreatWest clearly states that money damages, the classic form of legal relief,
108
is not contemplated by the language of section 502(a)(3).

See supra Part Il1.
See generallysupra Part Ill.
508 U.S. 248 (1993).
Seeid. at256.
See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1020 (2008).
534 U.S. 204 (2002).
Seeid. at218.
108. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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In response to Davila, plaintiffs have advanced numerous
arguments in support of the notion that compensatory damages are
available under section 502(a)(3), notwithstanding the Court's
unambiguous holding in Great-West and the settled modem
understanding that a claim for damages is the classic form of legal (and
not equitable) relief. Plaintiffs often base such claims on the equitable
theory of "surcharge." 10 9 Advocates assert that, in eighteenth century
England, a common law trustee could be "surcharged" so that a plaintiff
could receive money damages in a proceeding brought in a court of
equity." 0 Because ERISA is based on principles of trust law, the ability
of the chancellor to impose a "surcharge," they say, means that
compensatory damages should be seen as a form of equitable relief
"typically available" in equity within the meaning of Mertens. II
The argument has yet to succeed. Most courts have concluded that
a plaintiffs decision to rephrase a claim for damages does not alter the
fundamental nature of a claim for compensatory damages as being legal
rather than equitable. 12 Courts have, rightly in our view, rejected this
argument as an inappropriate extension of trust law. As the Tenth
Circuit put it, "[W]hile it is obvious that ERISA is informed by trust law,
the statute is, in its contours, meaningfully distinct from the body of the
common law of trusts. A method of interpretation consonant with this
realization will reject the unselective incorporation of trust law rules into
ERISA.""' 3 And, as Professor Muir has recognized, the Congressional

109. For example, the Department of Labor has regularly argued that money damages were
typically available in equity and therefore should be available under section 502(a)(3). See, e.g.,
Brief for the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae supporting Appellant's Petition for Panel and En
Banc Rehearing, Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005), cert denied (No. 03-11087); Brief
for the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiaesupporting Appellant and Requesting Reversal, Goeres v.
Charles Schwab & Co., 2007 WL 495191 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2007) (No. 05-15282); Brief for the
Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Requesting Reversal, Callery v. U.S.
Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied (No. 03-4097), 2003 WL 24309395; Brief
for the Sec'y of Labor as Amicus Curiae supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Urging Reversal, Coan
v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5173), 2005 WL 5071038.
110. Great-West, 534 U.S. 232-33.
111. Brief of Respondents at 34, LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., No. 06-856
(2007).
112. See Coan, 457 F.3d at 264 (rejecting the notion that artful pleading will permit the
transformation of freestanding claim for money damages into one for equitable relief); Knieriem v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., 434 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Merely re-labeling the relief sought
as 'restitution' or 'surcharge' does not alter the nature of a remedy from monetary to equitable.").
113. Moore v. Am. Fed. of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d 1236, 1244 n.17 (11th Cir.
2000). The First Circuit has made the same observation: "[o]rdinary trust principles cannot be
transferred wholesale, and, where ERISA itself specifies [the requirement], courts must be
especially cautious in creating additional ones." Barfs v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 287 F.3d 202, 207
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intent to encourage employers to sponsor employee benefit plans is a
"unique aspect of ERISA" that is central to a correct understanding in
4
applying the common law of trusts to ERISA's remedial provisions.'
The issue of appropriate equitable relief, including the surcharge
doctrine, was fully briefed in last year's most important Supreme Court
ERISA remedies case, LaRue v. De Wolff Boberg1 6& Associates.1 1 5 Yet
the Court explicitly declined to address the issue.'
A close review of the issue suggests that surcharge is a poor fit for
inclusion in the list of remedies "typically available" in equity within the
meaning of Mertens. Trust law authorities cited in support of the
surcharge argument typically involved a trustee who benefited
personally from conduct that was found to be a breach of fiduciary
duty.11 7 Those cases, of course, amount to the same thing as a claim for
equitable restitution, a remedy that has long been understood to be
available under ERISA. 1' 8 Other trust law authorities appear to limit
surcharge to cases in which a trustee acted in bad faith. 1' 9 ERISA's
fiduciary duty rules, of course, are not limited to such allegations.
Section 409 of ERISA makes ERISA fiduciaries personally liable for
any losses to the plan caused by a breach of fiduciary duty, irrespective
of intent. 20 Moreover, an unthinking transfer of trust law principles to
ERISA fails to recognize another "unique aspect" of ERISA, viz., the
well-settled' 2notion that employers who sponsor ERISA plans can wear
"two hats."' '
The Court conducted a lengthy examination of traditional equitable
remedies in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry,122 as
part of deciding whether a claim for back pay under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 2 3 should be considered a legal or
equitable claim for purposes of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
(lst Cir. 2002).
114.

Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or CongressionalCompromise?, 81 IOWA L.

REv. 1,51-52 (1995).
115.

128 S. Ct. 1020 (2008).

116. Id.
at 1026.
117. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc, 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Mosser v. Darrow, 341
U.S. 267, 272 (1951).

118. See, e.g., Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 361-63 (holding that a health plan administrator properly
sought "equitable relief' under section 502(a)(3)).
119. See, e.g., Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272 (holding that trustee's self-dealing was "willful and
deliberate"); accord RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt g.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006).
See Donovan v. Bierworth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982).
494 U.S. 558 (1990).
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
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trial. The Terry Court concluded that the historical reason the chancellor
entertained claims that we now think of as legal claims for damages is
that courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over actions involve a
trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. 124 The Court also noted that a
monetary recovery was often available in courts of equity only where it
was accompanied by a conventional equitable claim. 125 The Court thus
recognized that a monetary award may be characterized as an equitable
remedy if it is found to be an action for disgorgement ' of
improper profits
126
or "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief."
Justice Brennan famously observed in Terry that he had become
weary of "rattling through dusty attics of ancient writs" in determining
whether a particular remedy was legal or equitable. 127 Whether the
current Justices reached a similar conclusion after reading the briefs in
LaRue is unknown. In any event, LaRue suggests that a majority of the
current Justices are unwilling to undertake another examination of these
issues. 128 This assumption is confirmed by the Court's29 subsequent
refusal to grant certiorariin Amschwand v. Spherion Corp. 1
Results in cases like Amschwand are, at the end of the day, the
unavoidable consequence of an accurate reading of the statute. Unlike
employee rights statutes such as Title VII, the remedial purpose of
ERISA is simply "not to make the aggrieved employee whole."'' 30 That
the remedies provided by ERISA are insufficient to provide a traditional
make-whole remedy or compensatory damages in every situation is a

124. Terry, 494 U.S. at 571 n.8.
125. Id. at 570 ("[W]e have characterized damages as equitable where they are restitutionary,
such as in 'action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits."').
126. Id. at 571.
127. Id. at 574-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
128. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1023 ("The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner's argument that
the make-whole relief he sought was 'equitable' within the meaning of [section] 502(a)(3).
Although our grant of certiorari ... encompassed the [section] 502(a)(3) issue, we do not address it
because we conclude that the Court of Appeals misread [section] 502(a)(2).") (citations omitted).
129. 505 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008). Anschwand presented
compelling facts from a participant's perspective. There, a terminally ill employee was incorrectly
informed that his life insurance policy would carry over despite a change in insurance companies.
Id. at 344. After his death, the new carrier informed his widow that the life insurance policy had, in
fact, expired due to a clerical mistake on the part of the insurer. Id. at 344. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that section 502(a)(3) did not authorize a claim by the widow. Id. at 348. The court
reasoned that the remedy that the widow sought, the proceeds of the lost policy, was "simply a form
of make-whole damages" and the allegation of a breach of trust did not convert the restitutionary
remedy to an equitable one. Id.
130. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas, 368 F.3d 1246, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Mertens v.
Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 253, 261-62; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138,
142, 148 (1984)).
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simple reflection of the political compromises and policy judgments
made by Congress.
These policy
judgments plainly include the
31
1
formation.
plan
of
encouragement
Others will doubtless argue that the statute should be amended to
make it a traditional "make whole" statute, at least for claims brought by
participants and beneficiaries. Apart from the asymmetrical nature of
such a claim (why, after all, shouldn't everyone involved in any aspect
of plan administration be entitled to "make whole" relief), the ultimate
question posed by those arguments is whether such a regime could be
imposed without a collapse of the current system. We are skeptical.
There is, after all, another piece to the puzzle. Malingering
happens. Last fall, the State of New York launched an investigation into
the Long Island Rail Road ("LIRR") when it was discovered that over
ninety percent of LIRR employees retire and apply successfully for
disability pensions.1 32 Some of those receiving disability pensions were
famously described as being avid golfers, often playing on a state-owned
golf course fewer than twenty miles from the Hofstra University
campus. 133 To be sure, the benefit program at issue there is administered
by the Railroad Retirement Board and is not an ERISA plan. Yet, there
is little reason to believe that transforming ERISA into a "make whole"
statute would change human nature. And without a change in human
nature, one should be sensible about how we decide benefit eligibility
questions. Without rules, strictly enforced, the system will collapse.
Advocates of an expanded interpretation of section 502(a)(3)
inevitably fall back on the ultimately unpersuasive rationale that it is
unfair for people not to get fully compensated for all the negative things
that can happen. It's unfortunate that some people cannot afford health
insurance; it's also unfortunate when people lose their jobs and their
coverage. And one might say that it's unfair that insurance policies
don't cover anything and everything.' 34 But it's too late in the day to say
that ERISA is supposed to be all things to all people. The health care

131. It bears repeating that this is not a new problem. The Court made it clear twenty years
ago that ERISA does not provide a complete package of remedies. Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836 (1988) (observing that Congress decided to limit state law
garnishment claims against ERISA pension plans and not welfare plans).
132.

Duff Wilson, Insurance Dept. Enters L.I.R.R. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at

A32.

133. Walt Bogdanich, Retirees' Disability Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al.
134. This Article is plainly not a defense of the insurance industry. It bears mention that the
current benefit delivery system depends in large extent on a financially healthy insurance industry.
And, as in other areas of insurance, the continued health of insurers requires rejection of claims not
covered by the policy.
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issue is so complex that it would be a mistake to do anything about the
current situation except as part of a comprehensive review by Congress.
Incremental changes to the statute will only result in confusion,
inconsistencies, lack of uniformity of administration and enforcement,
higher costs to employers as well as plan members, and, ultimately,
fewer employee benefits plans.
B. Section 502(a) (2)-FiduciaryBreach Claims Involving 401 (k)
Plan
after LaRue
The Supreme Court's decision last year in LaRue v. DeWolff
Boberg, & Associates135 changed the rules regarding claims for damages
in individual account plans. In LaRue, the Court concluded that
participants in such plans have the right under ERISA to sue for
monetary damages caused by fiduciary breaches with respect to their
individual accounts. 136 The majority opinion found that the Fourth
Circuit had correctly applied language in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell, 137 that was widely understood to prohibit
individual claims for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2)
' 38
and that such actions could only be brought "on behalf of the plan."'
The Court modified the rule articulated in Russell, concluding that
significant changes in the employee benefit plan industry since the 1980s
compelled a different result in this case. 139 The Court noted the rising
importance of individual account based retirement plans and the fact
that, in the case of such plans, fiduciary breaches threatening the
financial soundness of such plans would directly impact the benefit
security of the individual plan participants. 140 In the Court's view,
ERISA's fundamental remedial purposes could be fulfilled only by
permitting individual participants in such plans to sue to recover
damages resulting from breaches of fiduciary duty under section
502(a)(2), regardless of whether such damages accrued to the benefit of

135. 128 S.Ct. 1020 (2008).
136. Id. at 1026.
137. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
138. Id. at 142 n.9. See also Fox v. Herzog Heine Geduld Inc., 232 Fed. App'x 104, 105 (3d
Cir. 2007); Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006); Magin v. Monsanto Co., 420 F.3d 679
(7th Cir. 2005); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1995); Kuper v.
lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (6th Cir. 1995); McDonald v. Household Int'l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424
(7th Cir. 2005); Izzarelli v. Rexene Products Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1523 (5th Cir. 1994).
139. LaRue, 128 S.Ct. at 1022.
140. Id. at 1025-26.
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one or all of the plan's participants. 141
Chief Justice Roberts issued a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Kennedy.1 42 The Chief Justice observed that because plaintiff's right to
direct his investment allocations was a right "granted and governed by
the plan," his claim was properly viewed as a claim for benefits that
turns on the "application and interpretation of the plan terms,
specifically those governing investment options and how to exercise
them.' ' 143 He then wrote that it is "at least arguable" that section
502(a)(1)(B) provides the only proper remedy for such claims. 44 The
Chief Justice then observed that it is "not clear" that plaintiff could also
bring a claim under section 502(a)(2).145 Because ERISA is a
"comprehensive and reticulated statute," and relying on Varity Corp. v.
Howe, 146 the Roberts' opinion argues that the sort of claim brought by
plaintiff might not be "appropriate" under section 502(a)(2). 147 The
Chief Justice noted with approval the decisions of lower courts refusing
to permit plaintiffs "from recasting" benefit claims as actions for breach
of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2). 148 The Chief Justice
concluded that these were unsettled questions not properly presented in
LaRue, suggesting both that they could be taken up on remand and that
"other courts in other cases remain free to consider what we have notwhat effect the availability of relief under [section] 502(a)(1)(B) may
have on ' a' 4 9 plan participant's ability to proceed under [section]
502(a)(2).

The Court's decision creates a new cause of action for ERISA plan
participants. Participants may now bring individual claims for losses to
a participant's plan account, irrespective of whether any other plan
participant, let alone a class of participants, can allege the same type of
loss.' 50 Such litigation can be brought by individuals alleging any sort of
mishandling of their plan accounts, including clerical errors and other
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1026 (Roberts, C.J. & Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.

144. Id.
145. See id. ("If LaRue may bring his claim under [section] 502(a)(1)(B), it is not clear that he
may do so under [section] 502(a)(2) as well.").
146. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
147. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1026-27.
148. Id. at 1027.
149. Id. at 1028. The plaintiff in LaRue ended up with no recovery and decided in October of
2008 to drop his claim due to financial infeasibility. See Fred Schneyer, A Simple Matter of
Economics La Rue Bows Out of Legal Fight, PLANADVISER MAGAZINE, Dec. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.planadviser.com/article.php/3362.
150. See LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025-26.
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innocent mistakes made by plan fiduciaries that allegedly caused a
"deplet[ion]" in the value of an individual's 401 (k) account balance.' 5 1
There is nothing in the Court's opinion to limit LaRue type actions
to 401(k) plans; the Court's opinion suggests that the cause of action
now authorized under section 502(a)(2) would extend to any ERISAregulated plan, including welfare plans. 1 2 One can imagine LaRue type
claims brought by participants in plans, e.g., Health Savings Accounts,
which also contain individual account features. More broadly, because
ERISA's fiduciary duty rules apply to welfare plans to the same extent
they regulate retirement plans, there exists the possibility of a wide range
of claims against plan sponsors and their party service providers
focusing on whether losses sustained can be argued as constituting a
plan "benefit." The characterization of what constitutes a plan "benefit,"
in light of consequential damages principles, will be increasingly
important in such litigation.153
The Court's decision in LaRue is likely to have the most immediate
impact on 401(k) plan "stock drop" litigation.' 5 4 There the Court held,
following LaRue, that group plan participants suing in their individual
capacities who chose to invest in company stock (the value of which was
allegedly inflated by misleading statements made by company
executives) could bring a claim under section 502(a)(2) even if other
participants of the plan were uninjured by the breach. 55 There is no
reason to believe there will be a different outcome in the 401(k) plan
"excessive fee" cases.
Litigation after LaRue will sort out a number of issues either
implicated or left open by the Court's decision. These include: the right
of plan participants who have "cashed out" of the plan to recover
damages; 156 the measure of such damages 157 identification of the proper
151. See id. at 1023-26.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat'l Latex Prods. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 822-26 (6th Cir. 2007)
(plaintiffs claims included a demand for unpaid medical claims submitted to providers, on a "make
whole" relief theory).
154. See, e.g., Rogers v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 521 F.3d 702, 703-05 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
appeal of lower court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based on the holding in LaRue).
155. Id. at704-05.
156. This issue of statutory standing is governed by Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 117 (1989). Lower courts have taken divergent approaches to the issue of what can be
called "former participant" standing. Compare Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing
Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the distinction
between "benefits" v. "damages" in claims brought by former employees), with Kuntz v. Reese, 785
F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986), and Graden v. Conexant Systems, Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir.
2007). Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2007), is thought by some to have
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defendant(s) in such cases; 158 and whether jury trials will be made
available. 159
The Chief Justice's concurring opinion may be the most durable
feature of the Court's opinion in LaRue. It seems to recognize the
practical problems associated with permitting individual claims for
breach of fiduciary duty in disputes that are, in the end, hard to
distinguish from traditional benefit claims. The Chief Justice's opinion
reflects an understanding of the importance, at least to plan sponsors, of
being able to require exhaustion of benefit claims and eligibility disputes
through procedures established in the plan. The Chief Justice is surely
correct in observing that these safeguards "encourage employers
and
160
others to undertake the voluntary step of providing plans."'

resolved the issue in favor of finding former participants have standing in section 502(a)(2) cases.
The Court's opinion did not resolve this question, however (either under Article Ill or the statute
itself) of such individuals to bring damages claims. See, e.g., Bendaoud v. Hodgson, 578 F. Supp.
2d 257, 281 (D. Mass. 2008) (analyzing standing of plaintiff who cashed out of plan prior to alleged
backdating scheme at issue in the section 502(a)(2) claim and finding that plaintiff lacked Article III
standing on the 502(a)(2) claim because he sought recovery on behalf of other plan participants).
157. The proper measure of damages in ERISA "lost profits" cases can be a complex question.
Several circuits measure a "loss" by comparing what the plan actually earned on the investment at
issue with what would have been earned if the assets had been invested in other alternatives
available under the plan. See, e.g., GIW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895
F.2d, 729, 733-34 (11 th Cir. 1990); Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (2d
Cir. 1989). Some courts have compared the loss on the investment at issue with other measures of
investment return as surrogates, such as prevailing interest rates or the return originally anticipated
on the investment. See, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 1984); Donovan v.
Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 1983).
158. The Court did not address whether either of the defendants was in fact an ERISA
fiduciary. The question of fiduciary status turns on whether the entity manages plan assets, and/or
has discretionary authority or control over plan administration with respect to disputed events. See,
e.g., Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1991); In re WorldCom, Inc., ERISA
Litigation, 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 760-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Certain conduct, such as clerical
mistakes, may not be actionable as fiduciary breaches. See Livick v. The Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24,
30 (1st Cir. 2008) (inaccurate estimate of plaintiff's benefit not actionable as breach of fiduciary
duty); Kannapien v. Quaker Oats Co., 507 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2007) (neither plant manager nor
human resources manager acted as a fiduciary when they discussed pension benefits with plan
participants).
159. Although most courts hold that jury trials are not available in ERISA litigation, some
courts have held or suggested otherwise, based on the reasoning that a claim for damages for breach
of fiduciary duty under section 502 seeks legal relief that will support a jury demand. See, e.g., Ellis
v. Rycenga Homes, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-694, 2007 WL 1032367 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (citing GreatWest and concluding that plaintiffs breach of fiduciary claim, seeking monetary damages, involved
claims for legal relief); Minn. Power & Affiliated Co.'s Ret. Plan v. Capital Guardian Trust Co., No.
07-3866, 2008 WL 2891057, *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 7, 2008) (court authorized plaintiff to proceed on a
jury trial in claim against financial manager).
160. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 1020, 1027 (2008) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
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To be sure, the Roberts concurrence will continue to engender
debate. For instance, the Chief Justice was not specific in suggesting
which subsection of section 502(a)(1)(B) would apply in a case of this
sort.
In some fact patterns, there may be significant outcomedeterminative differences in the treatment of claims seeking enforcement
of rights under the terms of the plan, or clarification of rights to future
benefits, compared to a claim for "recovery of benefits." His opinion
likewise does not address the question of how one would measure
"benefits" in a claim for benefits brought under section 502(a)(1)(B)
against "lost profits" that, according to the majority opinion, appear to
be recoverable under section 502(a)(2). Additionally, the Roberts
concurrence does not address the growing body of ERISA benefits
claims cases in which employees who are not plan participants are held
unable to bring an action under section
502(a)(1)(B) seeking to recover
1 61
plan.
the
of
terms
the
under
benefits
VI. CONCLUSION

The current debate about the scope of ERISA remedies reminds us
of the old Chinese proverb: "Be careful what you wish for." The courts
have properly recognized that ERISA's preemption provisions were
crafted to protect both employers who shoulder the growing costs of
employee benefit plans and the participants who benefit from them. A
change in the current balance of rights and remedies available under the
statute would create uncertainty in plan administration, higher costs to
employers, increased litigation, and, ultimately, fewer plans offered by
employers. Now, that would be ironic.

161.

See, e.g., Todisco v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., 497 F.3d 95, 102 (lst Cir. 2007).
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